Sick Europe and the Italian Elections
The elections in Italy prompted another round of knowing comments about how Europeans must get over their silly attachment to employment security (e.g. “Europe Stalls on Road to Economic Change”). None of the comments I saw even considered the possibility that the contractionary policies of the European Central Bank (ECB) play any role in Europe’s economic weakness.
The basic story here is fairly simple. While Alan Greenspan lowered the overnight interest rate in the United States to 1.0 percent in the summer of 2003, the ECB never lowered its overnight rate below 2.0 percent. This is in spite of the fact that inflation in the euro zone has been the same or lower than in the United States and the euro zone has consistently had higher rates of unemployment. The story does get more complicated (the Fed’s overnight rate is now 4.75 percent, compared to 2.5 percent in the euro zone), but I would argue that the ECB has consistently been more contractionary than the Fed in its policies. Everyone recognizes that the Fed can stimulate the economy with low interest rates and slow growth with high interest rates, why don’t we think that the European economy works the same way?
It is striking how commentators can make seemingly contradictory claims about Europe’s dire fate with great confidence. The basic story is that Europe’s high wages and labor market protections lead to high unemployment. This is crisis # 1 – too many workers.
Then we find crisis # 2 on the horizon, a surge in the ratio of retirees to workers, which is compounded by Europe’s slow population growth. The essence of crisis #2 is not enough workers. There are economists who will try to rationalize this picture to explain how Europe will be in crisis from both too much unemployment, while also suffering from a labor shortage, but on its face this does seem to be a stretch. (The link runs through high labor taxes discouraging work. The problem with the story is that after-tax wages, not labor taxes, determine willingness to work. The impact of high before tax wages, caused by the labor shortage, should swamp the impact of higher taxes.) In other words, the Europe critics seem to be telling completely contradictory scare stories, without even recognizing this fact.
There is another scare story that some of us have been telling that the Europe critics have largely ignored. This is about the imbalances created by housing bubbles. The United States is just one of several countries that are experiencing inflated housing prices. It is hard to gage how much of the run-up is justified and how much is due to irrational exuberance without some very careful country by country analysis, which I have not done. (For example, Ireland has had among the sharpest run-ups, but it has gone from being a relatively poor European country to ranking among the richest in the last two decades.)
However, the imbalances created by bubbles are easier to recognize. These show up in low domestic savings rates and high current account deficits. The countries that stand out on this list are the United States and Spain, with current account deficits of more than 6.0 percent of GDP, and New Zealand with a deficit of more than 9.0 percent of GDP. These deficits are unsustainable, as virtually all economists agree. The adjustments from large current account deficits to manageable deficits are almost always painful. Typically the adjustment is associated with rising inflation, and then high unemployment as central banks raise interest rates to stop inflation. (Think of increasing annual tax revenue and/or cutting government spending in the United States by $600 billion – the order of pain is comparable.)
The countries on which the Europe critics focus their wrath (France, Italy, and Germany) have small current account deficits or surpluses, meaning they don’t face the painful adjustments that loom for the Spain, the United States, and New Zealand. This means that when the adjustments actually occur, we may have a different assessment of which countries’ economies look good and which ones look bad. Until then, we will have to listen to many more tirades from the Europe critics, whose voices go virtually unanswered in the media.


19 Comments:
At 6:39 AM,
Tim Worstall said…
Oh dear. Missing the point about the eurozone entirely.
Interest rates are the same, as they must be in a currency area.
The economies are wildly different however. This was actually one of the best arguments against the euro project in the first place: nowhere close to being an optimal currency area.
If you want to post about European economics and economies do you think you can try to keep up? Interest rates are clearly too high for the German economy, too low for the Spanish and so on.
At 7:22 AM,
Anonymous said…
And is the economy of California identical to that of North Dakota?
At 10:57 AM,
christian h. said…
To some extent, Tim has a point, though it does not contradict anything Dean wrote. There is a problem in that the ECB considers inflation in any country of the currency union a risk, even if its economy is very small, while ignoring the need for low interest rates in the big economies. This is just perverse, but in my opinion it partly explains the tight policies of the ECB.
At 11:59 AM,
Anonymous said…
Tim nailed it.
At 6:18 PM,
Anonymous said…
What is the worry with the current account ratio? Why is it troublesome that non-American citizens should want to hold dollar denominated securities?
At 6:12 AM,
Tim Worstall said…
California and North Dakota identical? Of course not. But they are a great deal closer than the Eurozone economies.
There’s also a great deal of federal transfers: while there is regional aid within the EU and the eurozone it’s nowhere near the same level.
This is a little simplistic but at the bottom of the problem is that the eurozone economies are simply still too disparate to operate effectively with the same single interest rate.
At 10:42 AM,
Anonymous said…
One of the arguments against the euro was that it would turn large parts of Europe into North Dakota. It was not an argument you heard a lot. Nor were any others.
At 8:23 PM,
L said…
3 unrelated points
Dean Baker:
I'm not sure I understand your crises 1 and 2. I've never heard that there's going to be a labor shortage, in the sense that there won't be enough workers to meet the demand for products and services. Instead, I hear people fret that there won't be enough workers to pay taxes to support the retired. As far as I can tell, the effect points in the same direction as crisis 1.
Focus on the ECB seems a little strange, since it's such a new institution. I think the general point is correct, since I think the old national banks it replaced acted similarly. But I am not familiar what they did, and there was room for a lot of them. We should be able to tell if different kinds of banks produced different results.
One similarity between the economies of CA and ND is language. Workers move between them more easily than between eurozone countries, even now that there aren't legal barriers. On the other hand, I've heard that Jane Jacobs thought that cities are the optimal currency area.
At 10:16 AM,
Dean Baker said…
There are some issues about the heterogeneity of the economies in the euro zone, but it's hard to attribute weak post 1998 growth to that. The weakest performing economies (France, Germany, and Italy) are also the biggest. You would be hard-pressed to make the case that the ECB is designing its policies for Ireland or Greece.
Of course the problem of contractionary monetary policy predates the euro. The Maastricht Treaty locked everyone into a contractionary policy beginning in 1992(?). Even prior to that, the tight monetary policy pursued by the German central bank, coupled with the various currency linkages in place during the pre-euro days, imposed contractionary policy on Europe through most of the eighties. So, the problem with tight monetary policy did not begin with the formal establishment of the euro.
At 6:11 PM,
geoff said…
Even though the ECB never dropped rates below 2%, weren't they expanding their monetary base faster than the Fed when the Federal Funds rate was at 1%?
At 3:23 AM,
Γεώργιος Ιακ. Γεωργάνας said…
I would have thought structural weaknesses in nearly all the Eurozone economies warranted a more contractionary monetary stance than the Fed has taken in the US. Considerably more Eurozone citizens are shielded from the tough discipline of the labour markets than US citizens. Monetary policy should take up the slack. Alan Greenspan never tired of pointing out that the bipartisan consensus in favour of an ever more market-oriented economy allowed him to pursue the Fed policies he pursued. In fact, deregulation started in earnest during the Carter presidency and, thus, preceded Greenspan.
The ECB's "investment in sadism" (as its numerours, vocal but utterly misguided critics would call it) may yet pay off, as German exports start picking up and German workers at last confront the reality of world markets.
At 9:27 AM,
Erik L. said…
I'm not sure that high unemployment and the future pension problems are contradictory scares. As I understand it the problem with inflexible, highly regulated labor markets is that they encourage businesses to do more with capital in preference to labor. If they could build robots to do every new job they would. The pension problem is that eventually very few people will be producing the "stuff" in society versus those who are sitting in rockers not producing any "stuff". For some reason when arguing about this, people always talk about ratios of human workers to human retirees when it seems to me we really need to talk about the ability of the economy to produce stuff versus numbers of human retirees. If we could shore up worker numbers with cool futuristic robots, it seems to me everything would work out even with inadequate numbers of working age humans. That is, I think people are leaving capital and improvements in productivity due to technology out of the discussion.
At 12:32 AM,
L said…
Erik L:
Thanks, that makes a lot more sense to me than what Dean Baker said.
You could make a separate argument that restrictive employment rules discourage automation, because you're stuck with the workers. Theoretical economics probably avoids this by saying new companies will enter the market with automation. I suspect that barriers to entrepeneurs, both legal and cultural, are more important than employment regulation and taxation.
At 8:22 AM,
Erik L said…
I suppose restrictive employment rules could discourage automation if they said something to the effect of "no company shall use a machine to perform a task that could be performed by a currently unemployed human". In reality I don;t think employement laws ever say that. They more have to do with making it difficult to fire people. If a company working under such laws has the choice of adding production by adding workers or by adding machines, the difficulty in firing and other consequences of the regulations must be factored in as costs of labor. Often this makes the machines seem more cost effective.
At 9:06 AM,
Dean Baker said…
The points on automation are exactly why I don't see Europe facing the sort of long-term problem that has been widely reported in the media. The response to slower population and labor force growth is increased automation and the elimination of less productive jobs. This has the effect of raising economy-wide productivity and wages.
If before-tax wages rise rapidly, then there is no obvious economic problem with higher tax rates (the willingess to work depends in principle on the after-tax wage, not the tax rate). No one is going to want to pay higher taxes, but if their after-tax wages are rising at a healthy pace, it is very difficult to see what the problem is.
The issue of Europe's "structural weaknesses" is exactly what I see as up for debate. The mainstream of the profession has carried this debate far more by assertion than evidence. Their estimates of the non-accelerating inflation rates of unemployment (NAIRUs) for the various European countries have jumped all over the place without any obvious explanation in the structure of the labor markets.
I like to apply the "Baker Test" to the arguments put forward by the other side. If I argued a position against the orthodoxy with the sort of evidence they have to support their case, would anyone take me seriously? In the case of the argument that Europe's stagnation is due to its labor market rigidities, I would say that the answer is clearly "no."
At 9:10 AM,
Γεώργιος Ιακ. Γεωργάνας said…
So let's discuss those structural weaknesses. Government size is the most serious of them. It is hard to measure and even harder to evaluate its importance, but it is there. Here are some of its effects :
It distorts the measurements of the NAIRUs since in the Eurozone many more jobs than in the US are in the government sector and, hence, unemployment-proof (some government salaries and pensions are also indexed and, hence, inflation-proof). It would be great to have figures on underemployment of government employees, but we have not and shall never have.
Automation in the public sector fails to deliver all the benefits it delivers in the private sector, since public employees made redundant by it are either kept idle on the payroll, or are pensioned off ahead of time, thus draining further resources.
Thus, we are reduced to looking at the response of government deficits to monetary relaxation that for evidence of structural weakness. Ever since Adam Smith, economists have observed that the use of financial resources by the government is much more likely to lead to unproductive use of such resources (eg to increase wages of already pampered government employees, get their votes and inflate the overall price level), than to productive use of those resources (better government-employee discipline, better and more public services and, thus, real output growth).
Is it an accident that public-sector unions are so much more powerful in the Eurozone, than they are in the US ?
The risks in the Eurozone are compounded by the moral hazard problem. Governments in each member-state may run deficits knowing that the cost of eventually higher interest rates will be shared with other, less profligate governments.
It would seem to me that the mainsteam arguments do not rest on flimsy evidence, after all. However, I would like to see evidence, even equally flimsy, on the other side of this argument (a restatement of the Baker Test).
At 6:51 PM,
Anonymous said…
>It would seem to me that the mainsteam arguments do not rest on flimsy evidence, after all.
Er, evidence require those number thingys. Your post lacks even one (1), you just re-state the mainstream arguments. We've all heard them, thanks.
And your repeated use of the word "discipline", and descriptions like categorizing retired people as drain on resources (Grandma: get off that rocker!!) may be meant as economic terms but they seem to me that you have your full share of the neo-lib emotional baggage.
Eric L. notes one very likely component of Europe's future, and a second component is embedded in Dean's "wages rising" argument. To wit: a "retired" person is simply one on a pension. It doesn't mean that high wages won't draw him/her/it back into the labor pool. Even Europeans like to buy an extra trinket now and then.
And with their better healthcare and lifestyles they'll be darn capable workers, too.
-- a different chris
At 9:02 AM,
Γεώργιος Ιακ. Γεωργάνας said…
Ah, yes, those numbery things.
How many Americans, apart from teachers, can be away from their jobs for longer than two weeks per year ? In Europe we enjoy annual leave of four to six weeks per year.
Public sector workers in my native Greece draw on average 35% more pay for comparable work than workers in the private sector. The data is reported by no less than the central bank. Plus they cannot be fired. I would like to see how such a person can ever be motivated to perform any work. Highly qualified, postgraduate level, people swarm to public sector jobs in search of decent pay. After very competitive exams they end up doing cashier's duty. A high school diploma is all they would really need.
As for the retirees, most need only live for 7-8 years after retirement to spend the entire social security contributions they have been forced to save (calculated by applying a real growth plus inflation interest rate). This is not hard since retirement age is a maximum of 65 (more than 90% retire earlier, some in their 50's) and life expectancy is pushing 78.
Not all European countries are in such dire straights, but some big ones are. My view is that sound macroeconomic management needs to be complemented by getting incentives right. This is harder in an economy in which the state is too big. And nobody needs neo-liberals to know that. Post-Soviet economists can tell the story much better.
At 8:18 AM,
Lene Petite said…
Well,may be soviet economists can tell the story much better but I consider your thoughts be in the right direction and your comment seems to me be most informative and interesting than others...I agree with you.
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